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In 1990, after eight years of expansion, U.S. economic 
activity slowed down while inflation sped up. This bad 
economic news is quite different from a forecast made 
a year ago by a model that researchers at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis have developed and used 
for some time. In the fall of 1989, this model predicted 
strong economic growth and moderate inflation for 1990 
(Runkle 1989). The model's 1990 errors may make you 
more skeptical than usual about its general ability to 
forecast—but they shouldn't. Historical data show that 
errors as large as these are not unusual among economic 
forecasters; they're simply the result of bad luck. 
Despite its 1990 performance, that is, the model is 
sound, and its current predictions are as worthy of 
notice as ever. Unfortunately, those predictions are not 
good news. The model now says that a recession (as 
typically defined) is likely in 1991 and neither growth 
nor inflation will improve through the end of 1992. 
A Bad Year for the Model . . . 
The forecasting model used by Minneapolis Fed re-
searchers is a Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) 
model. Unlike many others, this type of forecasting 
model relies exclusively on statistical methods to 
extrapolate the historical relationships among economic 
variables into the future. (Human judgment about what 
might happen in the economy does not influence its 
forecast.)
1 
Unfortunately, as I said, the BVAR model's last pub-
lished forecast turned out to be pretty bad. Data for the 
first three quarters of 1990 (the most recent available as 
I write) show both slower growth and faster inflation 
than the model predicted. They also show that the 
model's errors were larger than those of many other 
economic forecasters. Chart 1 displays how poorly the 
model did compared to U.S. business economists on 
average, represented by the median predictions of 
forecasters surveyed by the American Statistical Associ-
ation (ASA) and the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER).
2 
The model's errors in predicting 1990 growth in the 
inflation-adjusted gross national product (real GNP) are 
primarily in two components: personal consumption of 
goods and services and private investment in residential 
structures. The model predicted that consumer spending 
would grow at an annual rate of 4.2 percent during the 
first three quarters of 1990; it actually grew only 1.5 
percent. The model expected residential investment to 
increase at an annual rate of 5.7 percent during that 
period; instead it decreased 6.2 percent. 
The model's errors in predicting inflation, as mea-
*Also Adjunct Associate Professor of Finance, University of Minnesota. 
'For background on BVAR models like this one, see Litterman 1984 and 
Todd 1984. 
2For background on this survey, see Zarnowitz 1969 and Keane and Runkle 
1989. 
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Chart 1 
How Bad Was It? 
Predicted and Actual Annual Rates of Change 





BVAR Model ASA-NBER Median 
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"These rates of change are for only the first three quarters because actual fourth quarter data 
are not yet available (on November 30,1990). These rates do not match those in Runkle 1989 
or on the table below because those are for the full year. 
Sources: BVAR model using data available on November 30,1989; NBER1989; 
U.S. Department of Commerce 
sured by changes in the GNP price deflator, are not so 
easily isolated. We can, however, make a good guess 
that energy price increases had a lot to do with them. 
Even before the Persian Gulf crisis, energy prices were 
rising rapidly. Yet, when the model made its 1990 
forecast, it predicted that energy prices, as measured by 
the energy component of the consumer price index, 
would fall at an annual rate of 1.9 percent during the 
first three quarters. This measure of energy prices 
actually rose at an annual rate of 23.5 percent during 
that period. 
. . . That Won't Necessarily Be Repeated 
Certainly it is regrettable that the BVAR model made 
large errors in predicting 1990's real growth and 
inflation. However, we need not assume that those 
errors mean the model is seriously flawed. The errors 
could be no larger than are reasonable for any forecast-
er, given the intrinsic uncertainty that exists in predict-
ing economic activity. 
Three Tests 
There are three standard ways to check whether a 
forecasting model is sound: 
• Compare the model's recent errors to its past er-
rors. Are its recent errors unusually large? 
• Add some variables to the model. Does that great-
ly reduce its errors? 
• Compare the model's recent errors to the past er-
rors of other forecasters. Are the model's errors 
unusually large? 
If the answer to any of these questions is yes, then 
probably something is wrong with the model that should 
be fixed before it forecasts again. But if the answer to 
all three is no, then we can be fairly confident that 
recently the model just had some normal bad luck. 
• The Model's Uncertainty 
The BVAR model can objectively quantify the amount 
of uncertainty in its own forecast using the history of its 
errors. As a result, we can examine whether the errors 
that the model made in 1990 are really unusual for it. 
They aren't. The model estimates that at least 30 
percent of the time it has made an error as large as it 
did in predicting the 1990 rate of growth in real GNP. 
And at least 20 percent of the time it has made an error 
as large as it did in predicting the 1990 change in the 
GNP price deflator. 
Even the model's worst errors are not unusual by this 
standard. Errors as large as the one for consumption 
growth have occurred about 20 percent of the time, 
while errors as large as the one for residential invest-
ment have occurred almost half the time. 
• An Obvious Omission 
Even though the model's 1990 errors are not unusual 
for it, they are disturbing because they are larger than 
the errors made by many other forecasters. Why should 
that be? Maybe the model does not include a crucial 
variable that those forecasters used in making their 
predictions. If so, the model could still be structurally 
flawed. Such a flaw would be serious because it might 
imply that the model would continue to make errors 
larger than those of other forecasters. Thus, we should 
3 try to see if adding some obviously missing variable to 
the model could make it more accurate. 
The most obvious, potentially serious omission in the 
model is a measure of the market value of the nation's 
housing stock. Since housing prices have declined 
recently in many parts of the country, that omission may 
explain some of the model's error in predicting both 
consumption growth and residential investment growth. 
An unexpected reduction in the value of any asset 
owned by consumers would make them reduce their 
spending. Houses are the most valuable asset most 
consumers own, so declining housing prices could cause 
substantial cutbacks in consumer spending. Declining 
housing prices would also make investment in housing 
less attractive, which would reduce residential invest-
ment. 
Since all forms of wealth should affect consumption 
growth, we would ideally include in the BVAR model 
some measure of the market value of all assets owned 
by consumers. Currently, the only measure of wealth it 
has is a measure of the value of the stock market. 
Therefore, adding some measure of the market value of 
the nation's housing stock should improve the model's 
forecast of consumption growth. 
But adding the best available measure doesn't. That 
measure is the U.S. Department of Commerce's con-
stant-quality index of new house prices. A statistical test 
shows that adding this measure to the model does not 
help it predict growth in real consumption or residential 
investment.
3 One possible reason for this failure is that 
the new house price index is a very inaccurate measure 
of the total market value of the nation's housing stock. 
Another possible explanation is that lower housing 
prices affect consumption and residential investment so 
quickly that even a perfect measure of housing prices 
would not improve the model's accuracy because the 
effect of changes in housing prices would be captured 
directly by other variables. 
• Other Forecasters' Uncertainty 
One test for a structural flaw remains: Have other 
economic forecasters been consistently more accurate 
than the BVAR model? Answering that question is more 
complicated than you might think. But the answer 
appears to be no. 
One way of comparing accuracy is fairly simple: 
Compare the model's 1990 errors to errors made by the 
average forecaster over the last 21 years. According to 
this comparison, errors as large as the model's in 1990 
are common. Between 1969 and 1989, when predicting 
three quarters ahead, the median ASA-NBER forecaster 
made larger errors in predicting real GNP changes 38 
percent of the time and larger errors in predicting 
deflator changes 52 percent of the time. 
Unfortunately, comparing the BVAR model's errors 
in 1990 to those of other forecasters over a much longer 
period does not necessarily mean the model is sound. 
Even if the model's 1990 errors were small compared 
to other forecasters' previous errors, the model's errors 
in previous years could have been larger than those of 
the other forecasters. Then the model would not be very 
useful. Therefore, we need to compare the model's 
long-term accuracy with that of other forecasters. 
Before doing that, we should define more explicitly 
what we mean by accuracy. One way to define it is to 
say that one forecaster is more accurate than another if, 
on average, the error the forecaster makes is closer to 
zero. We could see which of two forecasters is more 
accurate according to this definition by plotting how 
often each of the forecasters make different-sized errors. 
Chart 2 shows how the errors of two forecasters could 
be compared using this method. With average error as 
our guide, forecaster A is more accurate than forecaster 
B because A's errors are closer to zero, on average. 
But average error should not be the only component 
in the definition of accuracy. Even if two forecasters 
have exactly the same average error, one forecaster 
could be more accurate than the other by making fewer 
large errors. We could see this, too, by plotting how 
often different-sized prediction errors occur for each of 
two forecasters. Chart 3 shows that forecaster A and 
forecaster B have the same average forecast error, but 
here B is more accurate than A because B has fewer 
large errors. 
We hope that, according to both of these definitions, 
the BVAR model is at least as accurate as the median 
ASA-NBER forecaster. And it is. In the Appendix, I 
describe a method of testing simultaneously that each of 
two sets of forecasts has an average error close to zero 
and that the difference in the number of large errors in 
the two sets of forecasts is not statistically significant. 
I used this method to test whether the three-quarter-
ahead forecasts of real GNP and deflator changes that 
the model would have made at the end of each quarter 
during the past 21 years are as accurate as the actual 
3I did Granger-causality tests using quarterly data from 1963:1 to 1990:3 to 
see whether the log of the constant-quality index of new house prices (deflated 
by the consumer price index, exclusive of shelter) helped to predict either the 
log of real consumption or the log of residential investment. It did not. 
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Charts 2 and 3 
Two Views of Accuracy 
Chart 2 Size of Average Error 
(The Smaller, the More Accurate) 
Chart 3 Number of Large Errors 
(The Fewer, the More Accurate) 
three-quarter-ahead forecasts of those variables made by 
the median ASA-NBER forecaster.
4 The results of those 
tests: both the model and the median ASA-NBER 
forecaster made predictions which have an average error 
not significantly different from zero, and the number of 
large errors the two forecasters made is not significantly 
different. This suggests that the BVAR model's predic-
tions are not systematically less accurate than those of 
other forecasters.
5 
Two Extra Uses 
Thus, the BVAR model has passed all three tests of 
soundness. Even though the model's 1990 errors are 
large, they are not unusual compared to the model's 
own past errors or to the past errors of other forecasters. 
Furthermore, the errors do not appear to have been 
caused by the exclusion of a measure of housing prices. 
This suggests that the model has no serious structural 
flaws and so can be trusted (as much as ever) to predict 
beyond 1990. We can also, by the way, use it to per-
form two tasks that conventional forecasters cannot. 
First, as I said, the model can objectively quantify 
the amount of uncertainty in its forecasts. By using the 
history of its own errors, the model can simulate the 
likely range of its errors in the future. Since the model 
can do this, it can also compute the probability that a 
certain economic event will happen. For example, the 
model can compute the probability that during 1991 the 
U.S. economy will fall into recession (defined in some 
precise way) and inflation will be greater than 5 percent 
(or any other number we choose). 
Second, the model can answer useful hypothetical 
questions. For example, as I write, real GNP growth 
during 1990's fourth quarter is still uncertain. I could 
ask the model how much more likely a recession would 
be during the next year if, during the fourth quarter of 
this year, real GNP contracted at an annual rate of 3 
percent instead of growing at an annual rate of 1 
percent. Other forecasters cannot answer such questions 
in an objective, statistical manner. 
A Bad Outlook for the Economy 
Since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, U.S. 
economic conditions have deteriorated rapidly. Among 
the falling indicators are measures of employment, 
industrial output, and both consumer confidence and 
spending. These weak economic conditions lead the 
BVAR model to now predict fairly weak conditions 
through 1992. 
1991: Recession 
Near the end of November 1990, the head of the 
Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, described the 
U.S. economy as in a "meaningful downturn" (Rosen-
"^These model forecasts use revised, not preliminary data, so their errors may 
be different than those the model actually would have made at the time. 
However, the model has been used for only six years, so it does not have 
enough of a forecast history to meaningfully compare its actual forecasts to 
those of other forecasters. Using revised data is thus the best method of 
comparing the accuracy of the model's forecasts to that of the median ASA-
NBER forecaster. 
5The model's own past errors also suggest that even the large errors in 
predicting 1990 consumption and residential investment growth are not unusual. 
Errors as large as the one for consumption growth occur about 15 percent of the 
time, while errors as large as the one for residential investment growth occur 
almost half the time. 
5 baum 1990). But how likely is a recession, as usually 
defined? That is, how likely is it that real GNP will 
decline at least two quarters in a row? The model 
predicts that real GNP will decline at an annual rate of 
1.5 percent during the fourth quarter of 1990. It says the 
odds of at least two consecutive quarters of negative 
real growth occurring between then and the fourth 
quarter of 1991 are 50-50. But the model also says that 
a recession starting in those five quarters would not last 
long. The chances that real growth will be negative in 
four of the five quarters, it says, are only 12 percent. 
As I said, today there is still considerable uncertainty 
about how much real GNP will actually grow during the 
fourth quarter of 1990. But the model can estimate how 
the amount of real growth during this quarter will affect 
its estimate of the probability of recession by the end of 
1991. Chart 4 shows these estimates. If real GNP grows 
at an annual rate of 1 percent during the fourth quarter, 
the model estimates the probability of recession as only 
30 percent. But if real GNP falls at an annual rate of 3 
percent during the quarter, it estimates that probability 
as 61 percent. 
Restricting recession to its usual definition may be 
too restrictive, however. The NBER, which many 
economists view as the official arbiter of recessions, 
does not always use the narrow definition. For example, 
Chart 4 
How the Chances of a 1991 Recession* 
Depend on Growth in 1990's Fourth Quarter 
Estimated by the BVAR Model 
61% 
-3 -2-10 1 
% Change in Real GNP at an Annual Rate in 1990:4 
*A recession here is defined as two or more consecutive quarters of negative real growth in GNP. 
the NBER decided a recession had occurred in 1980 
even though real GNP had declined only during the 
second quarter. 
Currently, the BVAR model predicts that employ-
ment will decline from July 1990 until June 1991 and 
that industrial production will fall from October 1990 
until September 1991. If employment and industrial 
output fall that long, the NBER will probably declare 
that the economy is in a recession even if real GNP has 
not fallen for two consecutive quarters. In fact, since 
employment has declined in every month since July, the 
NBER may have already declared a recession by the 
time you read this. Thus, the model suggests that the 
probability of a 1991 recession, defined by some 
broader-than-usual measure, is very high. 
1991-92: Weak Growth and Moderate Inflation 
As the accompanying table shows, the BVAR model's 
longer-term outlook is not much better. 
The model predicts that real GNP growth will remain 
weak over the next two years because domestic, private 
sector demand will remain sluggish. Real GNP is 
predicted to grow only 1.5 percent between the fourth 
quarter of 1990 and the fourth quarter of 1991—less 
than half as much as the average growth during the past 
40 years. In fact, growth was that low in only 11 of 
those 40 years. Growth is expected to pick up only 
slightly in 1992. 
The table also shows what's behind this growth 
prediction. Over the next two years, the model predicts, 
consumption and investment spending growth will 
remain at levels usually seen in recessions. The model 
expects export growth to be the only source of strength 
in these years. 
Consumer spending is expected to grow at an annual 
rate of only 1.1 percent during both 1991 and 1992. To 
put that prediction in perspective, in only two of the 
seven recessions since 1950 did consumption grow 
slower than 1.7 percent during a year. Thus, the forecast 
calls for significantly weaker consumption growth than 
usually occurs in recessions. 
Weak consumption growth may stem from uncertain-
ty about future employment. The model predicts that 
total employment will grow only 0.4 percent in 1991 
and will remain below its July 1990 level until January 
1992. The model also predicts that unemployment will 
rise to 6.5 percent by the end of 1991 and creep even 
higher by the end of 1992. 
Investment spending is expected to decline in each of 
the next two years. The slump in residential construction 
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Indicator  1990  1991  1992  Average 
Annual Growth Rates 
(4th Qtr. % Changes From Year Earlier) 
Real Gross National Product (GNP)  .6%  1.5%  2.1 %  3.3 % 
Consumer Spending  .9  1.1  1.1  3.4 
Durable Goods  .5  -3.0  -3.5  5.0 
Nondurable Goods and Services  1.0  1.8  2.0  3.2 
Investment  -2.4  -4.6  -2.0  4.2 
Business Fixed  .7  -4.6  .3  3.8 
Residential  -8.3  -5.6  -9.5  3.3 
Government Purchases  1.7  .1  2.3  3.9 
GNP Price Deflator  4.7  4.3  4.3  4.2 
4th Quarter Levels 
Change in Business Inventories (1982$)  13.1 bil.  14.1 bil.  14.6 bil.  13.4 bil. 
Net Exports (1982$)  -45.0 bil.  18.6 bil.  71.0 bil.  -19.4 bil. 
(Exports less Imports) 
Civilian Unemployment Rate  5.8 %  6.5 %  6.7 %  5.7 % 
(Unemployment as a % of the Civilian Labor Force) 
"This is the forecast of a Bayesian vector autoregression model using data available on November 30,1990. 
"Actual numbers are based on data for the first three quarters of 1990 and the BVAR model's forecast for the fourth quarter of 
1990 (using data available on November 30,1990). 
Sources of actual data: U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 
is expected to continue over this time. This suggests 
that, though the model does not include an explicit 
measure of housing prices, it has picked up their decline 
indirectly, in other data that are influenced by them. 
Business fixed investment is also predicted to remain 
weak for the next two years. 
Both the consumption and the investment forecasts 
bear patterns typical of recessions. The outlook for 
consumption includes cuts in spending on durable goods 
accompanied by below-average growth in spending on 
nondurables and services. And again, the outlook for 
investment includes weakness in both the residential and 
business sectors. These patterns have occurred during 
each of the seven recessions since 1950. 
The fact that the model predicts weakness for both 
consumption and residential investment over the next 
two years also suggests that it has learned from its 
recent errors. BVAR models use their own past errors 
to adapt to changing patterns among economic variables. 
And this BVAR model appears to have adjusted quickly 
to the errors that it made in overpredicting 1990 con-
sumption and residential investment growth. 
The model's 1991-92 consumption and investment 
forecasts are so weak that the only reason the model 
does not predict an extended U.S. recession is that it 
predicts a simultaneous large improvement in net 
exports. It expects the difference between the values of 
exports and imports to turn around from a large nega-
tive at the end of 1990 to a large positive by the end of 
1991—and then to nearly quadruple a year later. This 
prediction comes from a forecast of slower import 
growth and continued fast export growth. 
Is that reasonable? Slower import growth certainly 
seems so, in the context of the model's anemic forecast 
for consumption and investment growth. It is also con-
sistent with the historical observation that import de-
mand grows slowly when the economy is weak. 
The model's prediction of fast export growth might 
also seem reasonable, since the value of the U.S. dollar 
has fallen recently, making U.S. products less expensive 
7 to buyers in other countries. But the prediction of strong 
export growth will be correct only if the economies of 
other countries remain strong. If other countries also 
experience weak consumption and investment demand, 
then U.S. export growth is likely to be slower than the 
model predicts. 
Slower export growth would, of course, make the 
U.S. outlook for real growth even worse. For example, 
if net exports were to improve in both of the next two 
years by the amount the model now predicts for 1991 
($20 billion) and the rest of the model's forecast was 
correct, real GNP would grow by less than half a 
percentage point in both of the next two years. 
Compared to the growth forecast, the inflation 
forecast is optimistic. According to the model, the 
current spate of inflation, induced by rising oil prices, 
will not continue into the next two years. The model 
predicts that the GNP deflator will rise at an annual rate 
of 5.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 1990, pulling up 
the 1990 increase to 4.7 percent. But the model also 
predicts that the increase in the deflator will slip to 4.3 
percent in both 1991 and 1992. 
A quick look at what other forecasters are predicting 
for 1991 supports at least that part of the model's 
forecast. Early in November, the consensus of private 
economists surveyed by the Blue Chip Indicators was 
for a 1991 increase of 1.2 percent in real GNP and 4.3 
percent in the deflator (Blue Chip 1990). This is essen-
tially the same forecast as the BVAR model's. 
Beware of Good News 
Despite 1990's poor showing, the BVAR model makes 
good forecasts, on average. Still, more than the average 
amount of uncertainty remains about the current out-
look. One reason for that is political: the current insta-
bility in the Mideast. Another is statistical. History 
shows that during periods of economic contraction, the 
early estimates of data can be particularly misleading. 
Even if real GNP actually declines in the fourth quarter, 
there is a substantial probability that the initial estimates 
of GNP growth will not show that. According to the 
data, real GNP has actually declined in 21 quarters since 
1968. But in 9 of those 21 quarters, the initial estimates 
of growth were positive, not negative. Thus, we must be 
especially careful interpreting the early data for the 
fourth quarter of 1990. Even if good news is initially 
reported, the actual situation may be quite different. 
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Appendix 
Comparing the Accuracy of Two Sets of Forecasts 
This appendix describes a simple method—used in the preced-
ing paper—of testing whether two sets of forecasts are equally 
accurate. 
Suppose that two different forecasters, i and j, predict the 
/:-step-ahead growth rate of inflation-adjusted gross national 
product (real GNP) in each period. For example, at time t, 
forecaster i makes the prediction F,'k. At time t + k, the error 
in that prediction becomes known, when the actual growth 
rate, At+k, becomes known. The error, Et'k, is equal to At+k 
- Ft'k. Suppose that the two forecasters each have a set of 
forecast errors, Et'k and E
Jtk where t = 1, 2, 3, ..., T. One 
condition that seems reasonable to impose is that a set of 
forecasts will be called accurate only if, on average, its errors 
are close to zero; that is, the forecast is unbiased. Two sets of 
unbiased forecasts might be called equally accurate if the 
average difference of their squared forecast errors is small. 
Diebold and Runkle (1990) derive a simple generalized 
method-of-moments (GMM) specification test for the 
unbiasedness and equality of average squared errors in two 
sets of k-step-ahead forecasts.
1 Every GMM specification test 
requires a set of orthogonality conditions, that is, conditions 
which should have an expected value of zero in the popula-
tion. The simplest version of Diebold and Runkle's test has 
three such conditions: 
• The expected value of the forecast error from forecaster 
i is equal to zero. 
• The expected value of the forecast error from forecaster 
j is equal to zero. 
• The expected value of the difference in the squared 
forecast errors is equal to zero. 
If the sample averages of these orthogonality conditions are 
denoted as g and the inverse of the covariance matrix of the 
orthogonality conditions is denoted as W, then Tg'Wg will be 
distributed asymptotically as a chi-squared random variable 
with three degrees of freedom.
2 If the value of that test 
statistic were larger than 7.81, then the null hypothesis of 
unbiasedness and equality of average squared errors could be 
rejected at the 95 percent confidence level. 
For tests of the forecasts in the preceding paper, I used 84 
quarterly observations on the errors in predicting the annual-
ized rate of change in real GNP and the GNP price deflator. 
The forecasters were the two in the paper: the Bayesian vector 
autoregression (BVAR) model developed by researchers at the 
Minneapolis Fed and the median business economists surveyed 
by the American Statistical Association (ASA) and the Nation-
al Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The time period 
was from the fourth quarter of 1968 to the third quarter of 
1989.
3 
The results are clear. The statistic from the chi-squared test 
comparing the errors that the two forecasters made for real 
GNP growth was 2.16, while that for the deflator was 4.64. 
Both of these test statistics are far below the critical value of 
7.81. Thus, the test does not reject the hypothesis that for the 
changes in both real GNP and the deflator, the BVAR model 
and the median ASA-NBER forecaster made unbiased 
forecasts with equal average squared errors. In this sense, that 
is, the two sets of forecasts are equally accurate. 
'Newey (1985) developed the first GMM specification tests. 
2For further details of this test, including how to construct W, see Diebold 
and Runkle 1990. 
3The model's forecasts are not real-time; they are based on revised data. 
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